



The practice of segregation in private schools vividly pre-
sents the conflict between claimed personal rights of privacy and
free association on the one hand and the rights guaranteed and
enforced by the thirteenth amendment' and section 1981 of title
42 of the United States Code2 on the other. Two recent suits
against segregated private schools under section 1981, McCrary
v. Runyon3 and Riley v. Adirondack Southern Schoolfor Girls,4 reveal
the need for a reexamination of the scope of that section.
Section 1981, formerly section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, 5 provides in part that "[a]ll persons.., shall have the same
' U.S. CONST. amend. XIII provides:
"Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legisla-
tion."
2 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other.
3 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc), aff'g in relevant part Gonzales v. Fairfax-
Brewster School, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 354
(1975) (Nos. 75-62, 75-66, 75-278, 75-306). [Both the district and circuit court decisions
hereinafter cited as McCrary.]
The district court opinion has been widely commented upon. See Note, Desegregation
of Private Schools: Section 1981 as an Alternative to State Action, 62 G~o. L. J. 1363 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Alternative to State Action]; Note, The Desegregation of Private Schools: Is
Section 1981 the Answer?, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1147 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Is Section
1981 the Answer?); Comment, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. Extended to Private Education:
Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 122 U. PA. L. REV. 471 (1973) (favoring deci-
sion on state action ground) [hereinafter cited as Private Education]; 11 HOUSTON L. REV.
691 (1974); 18 How. L.J. 458 (1974); 7 LOYOLA U.L. REV. 634 (1974); 45 Miss. L.J. 246
(1974) (favoring reversal); 10 TULSA L.J. 292 (1974); 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 767 (1973); 8 U.
RICHMOND L. REV. 285 (1974); 26 VAND. L. REV. 1307 (1973).
1 368 F. Supp. 392 (M.D. Fla. 1973), appeal docketed, No. 74-1976, 5th Cir., Apr. 15,
1974.
5 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, reenacted, Enforcement Act of 1870, ch.
114, § 18, 16 Stat. 144.
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right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by
white citizens .... -6 The section was enacted by Congress pur-
suant to its authority under the thirteenth amendment to outlaw
slavery. It is unclear how far section 1981 extends, and, in par-
ticular, whether the section outlaws private school segregation.
7
If the section is construed to prohibit such segregation, as it was
in McCrary, Congress may have exceeded its power to enforce
the amendment by infringing constitutional rights to privacy and
freedom of association, as guaranteed by the first amendment.
This Comment will consider the significance of the claim, raised
in both McCrary and Riley, that racial discrimination in private
school admissions is a constitutionally protected activity., The
recent Fifth Circuit decision in Cook v. Hudson9 will be considered
in evaluating the constitutional interest, if any, in segregated
private schools. 10
The Comment will conclude that section 1981 as currently
interpreted may constitutionally be applied to private schools.
This Comment will also propose, however, a new interpretation
of the section, somewhat analogous to the theory of mitigation of
damages, which would strengthen the case for applying the
statute to private schools by not denigrating vital associational
6 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
7 Much of the debate about the revival of § 1981 and its companion, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 (1970), revolves around the legislative history of these and other civil rights laws.
See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (compare majority with
dissenting opinions). This Comment will for the most part ignore the historical approach
to interpretation of the statutes, in part because of adequate coverage elsewhere, and in
part because the use of legislative history in this context is often not helpful when used
only as a makeweight after evaluation of other issues.
8 See generally Note, Section 1981 and Private Groups: The Right to Discriminate Versus
Freedom from Discrimination, 84 YALE L.J. 1441 (1975). Some commentators have sug-
gested that the proper method for attacking private school segregation is through use of
a state action-public function analysis, e.g., Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, 82
YALE L.J. 1436 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Academies]; Private Education, supra note 3.
These articles adequately cover most of the strengths and weaknesses of this approach.
This Comment will not discuss the state action analysis, in part because of the prior
treatment and in part because state action was not an issue actually addressed in the
McCrary and Riley litigations. The shortcomings of the state action theory are most
graphically set forth in Alternative to State Action, supra note 3, at 1366-69.
9 511 F.2d 744 (5th Cir.), affg 365 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Miss. 1973), petition for cert.
filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3230 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1975) (No. 75-503).
10 The district court opinion is commented upon in Comment, Cook v. Hudson: The
State's Interest in Integration Versus the First Amendment Rights of the Public Schoolteacher, 45
Miss. L.J. 953 (1974) (favoring reversal); 6 N.C. CENT. L.J. 107 (1974). Text accompany-
ing notes 101-15 infra. In Hudson, a divided court upheld a school board policy against
hiring or rehiring teachers whose children attend private school. The school board
adopted this policy to reinforce a court-ordered program of desegregation of the public
school system. The case presents a variation of the conflict between asserted first
amendment rights and rights to racial equality.
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and privacy rights which might be infringed by an unlimited ap-
plication of section 1981. Section 1981 may be limited by re-
quiring that the plaintiffs show actual injury in the market for
education because of racial discrimination by the defendants;
if alternative equivalent education is obtainable, no violation of
section 1981 should be found. While section 1981 guarantees to
nonwhites the same right to contract as whites, this right should
be interpreted in light of the traditional requirement in the law
of contracts that real injury in the marketplace be shown."
I. ATTACKS UPON PRIVATE SCHOOL SEGREGATION:
MCCRARY AND RILEY
In Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc.,12 it was alleged
that two black children were denied admission to defendant pri-
vate schools because of their race in violation of section 1981.
The district court, finding that the schools' admissions policies
reflected "no 'plan or purpose of exclusiveness' for selection of
students 'other than race',"'1 3 awarded damages for plaintiffs'
humiliation and enjoined defendants from practicing racial dis-
crimination in admissions in the future.'
4
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in
McCrary v. Runyon. ' 5 Chief Judge Haynsworth wrote: "The sec-
tion is violated by the school as long as the basis of exclusion is
racial, for then it is clear that the black applicant is denied a
contractual right which would have been granted to him if he
had been white.' 6 At defendants' schools, there was a class of
qualified applicants defined by "academic, financial, and other
restrictions upon admission," but "[w]ithin the qualified class...
there is no other limitation upon the admission of white appli-
cants up to the school's capacity."' 7 That some whites were out-
"See, e.g., A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1039-44 (1964).
12 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd in relevant part sub nom. McCrary v.
Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 354 (1975) (Nos.
75-62, 75-66, 75-278, 75-306).
13 363 F. Supp. at 1204 (quoting Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229,
236 (1969), which established that a private group that is not a "private club" under Title
II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq. (1970), is not exempt from 42
U.S.C. § 1982 (1970)).
14 The injunction applied not only to the named defendant but also to the Southern
Independent School Association, an intervening defendant. This Association alleged that
it represents "over 300 private, non-profit schools in the South, some of which con-
cededly are racially exclusive in their admission policies." 515 F.2d at 1084.
11 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 354 (1975) (Nos.
75-62, 75-66, 75-278, 75-306).
16 515 F.2d at 1087.17 Id.
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side that class did not "undo" the section 1981 violation, the
court reasoned, because the Supreme Court had found viola-
tions of section 1982,18 whose scope closely parallels that of sec-
tion 1981, in the segregation of private clubs that admitted all
white persons up to the clubs' capacity. 19
Judge Haynsworth disposed of the defendants' claim to as-
sociational and privacy rights by pointing out that the schools
were free to teach whatever doctrines and to use what-
ever methods they wished.20 Moreover, these private groups
could legitimately apply non-racial restrictions on admission,
even if a racial imbalance in the student population resulted.
The schools could not discriminate on the basis of race, how-
ever,2 1 notwithstanding the Supreme Court's speculation in
Norwood v. Harrison that the "Constitution may compel toleration
of private discrimination .... 22
The dissenting judges in McCrary made two important ar-
guments. First, Judge Russell asserted that "[t]he right to make
and enforce contracts does not imply a right to coerce an unwil-
ling co-contractor into making any and every variety of
contract. '23 In his view, Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,24 in which
the right of a private club to discriminate was upheld even
though it possessed a state liquor license, indicated that the un-
willing co-contractor has the right to discriminate when impor-
tant personal preferences are involved. Second, the dissent
urged that the contractual features of application for admission
to the defendant private schools were quite insubstantial so that
the right to contract was in effect a pretense, a mere "door
opener," to enable a court to reach the desired result.
Without endorsing the right of private schools to discrimi-
nate in admissions, the court in Riley v. Adirondack Southern School
for Girls25 suggested a somewhat narrower application of section
1981 than did the McCrary majority. In Riley the plaintiff sought
Is 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."
19 Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973); Sullivan v.
Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
20 515 F.2d at 1087. The court relied on Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
21 515 F.2d at 1088.
22 413 U.S. 455, 463 (1973).
23 515 F.2d at 1093 (Russell, Field & Widener, JJ., dissenting).
24 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
25 368 F. Supp. 392 (M.D. Fla. 1973), appeal docketed, No. 74-1976, 5th Cir., Apr. 15,
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to enroll her black daughter in a private, all-white girls' school in
Florida. The district court was "not persuaded that, but for her
race the Plaintiff's child would have been accepted. '26 There-
fore, while the court found that the evidence as a whole strongly
suggested that race was one factor in the applicant's rejection, it
denied relief.
27
Both Riley and the dissent in McCrary tend to limit the appli-
cation of section 1981 in suits against private segregated schools.
In McCrary the dissent found a right in private schools to dis-
criminate racially in their admissions process because of privacy
and associational interests, and in Riley the court relied on a
restrictive definition of causation. Neither case was actually de-
cided on the basis of the claimed associational and privacy in-
terests. These interests warrant closer examination as they are
crucial to the formulation of more rational principles of con-
struction for section 1981.
II. SECTION 1981 AND AsSOCIATIONAL
AND PRIVACY RIGHTS: AN OVERVIEW
The law of section 1981, of privacy, and of association have
not yet been effectively synthesized. Before a synthesis can be
attempted, some overview of the areas is necessary.
A. The Right to Make and Enforce Contracts under Section 1981
Two principal theories of the meaning of the phrase "the
same right . . . to make and enforce contracts"' 28 have been
expressed in the cases and the literature.
26 368 F. Supp. at 395. On appeal, plaintiff-appellant will argue that the other
reasons for rejecting her child were subterfuges for race, and that any other finding
would be clearly erroneous. Brief for Appellant at 1.
27 368 F. Supp. at 395.
Riley may be consistent with McCrary in that the plaintiff in Riley failed to meet
non-racial standards established by the school. By applying McCrary's analysis, Riley need
only have held that a violation of § 1981 occurs when a party is denied an opportunity to
make a contract that he could have made had he been white, but that when racial bias
may have been only incidentally appeased, no violation of § 1981 can be found. Indeed
Riley itself states that "[u]nless it can be shown that, but for race the complainant would
have succeeded [in making a contract], there is no denial of rights assured by § 1981." Id.
at 398. A § 1981 action can succeed only when race is found to be the sole element in the
rejection of a student applicant. This explains why the court disregarded its finding that
racial bias played a part in the decision to reject the applicant.
If, on the other hand, appellant in Riley is correct in asserting that race was the only
factor in the decision to reject, the other factors being a subterfuge, then affirmance of
the district court would be inconsistent with McCrary.
28 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
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An early interpretation of the scope of section 1981 was
given in Hodges v. United States. 2 9 That case arose when a group
of white men resorted to violence to prevent certain blacks from
securing employment in a sawmill. The Supreme Court reversed
the criminal conspiracy convictions which had been based on the
violation of section 1981 rights, indicating that the acts of intimi-
dation did not impose a condition of slavery upon their victims.
Having reached this conclusion, the Court proceeded to describe
the intended scope of section 1981 in terms of prohibition of
government-imposed restrictions upon an individual's capacity
to make contracts.
30
This interpretation of section 1981 has been dealt three
blows that must by now be deemed mortal. In Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co.,31 a suit based on section 1982, defendant refused for
reasons of race to sell a house to a prospective buyer who was
black. The Supreme Court held that section 1982 reaches private
discrimination and observed that section 1981 also applies to
private discrimination, overruling Hodges to the extent of
inconsistency. 32 In Tillian v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Associa-
tion,33 the Court again indicated that section 1981 is applicable to
private dealings, but did not define the scope of that application.
The demise of the state involvement approach was confirmed
recently in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., a suit in which
plaintiff alleged employment discrimination under section 1981.
The Supreme Court affirmed that section 1981 "affords a fed-
eral remedy against discrimination in private employment on the
basis of race. '34 Clearly the approach taken beforeJones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co. to interpreting "right to contract" can no longer
serve as the basis for interpretation of this statute. 5
29 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
30 Id. at 17-18. This was the traditional approach to interpretation of "right to con-
tract." See, e.g., Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S.
525, 533-34 (1949); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53-55 (1905); Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 590-91 (1897) (cases representing both sides of the "economic
substantive due process" debate). See also California Drive-in Restaurant Ass'n v. Clark,
22 Cal. 2d 287, 295, 140 P.2d 657, 662 (1943); Mathewson v. Mathewson, 79 Conn. 23,
24-26, 63 A. 285, 286-87 (1906); Elder Chevrolet Co. v. Bailey County Motor Co., 151
S.W.2d 938, 942 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
31 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See also Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229
(1969) (damage remedy for violation of § 1981).
32Id. at 441 n.78.
33 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
34 95 S. Ct. 1716, 1720 (1975).
35 For a discussion of this theory and its demise, see Alternative to State Action, supra
note 3, at 1370-73 & sources cited in id. 1370 n.33.
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The holdings in McCrary3 6 and Riley37 illustrate the second
major approach to section 1981, predominant since Jones, in
holding that the section is violated when a nonwhite cannot
make a contract he could have made had he been white. The
novelty of these holdings lies only in their application to com-
pletely private schools.38 Several courts of appeals had reached
similar results prior to McCrary and Riley in several cases involv-
ing employment contracts39 and in a case involving a privately
owned recreation area.40 As noted above, the Supreme Court
held in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc. that section 1981
applies to private discrimination in employment. 41 But the Court
there had no occasion to endorse or reject the standard ulti-
mately articulated in McCrary and Riley defining violation of sec-
tion 1981. There is, however, nothing in Johnson to indicate a
more restrictive interpretation.
This more recent line of reasoning is quite expansive. Sec-
tion 1981 so interpreted applies to the entire body of relation-
ships that may be defined as contractual. Whether the relation-
ship is business or personal is not, according to this view,
important. 42 This interpretation may be limited by strict defini-
tion of what is a contract. For example, the Court of Appeals for
36 McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. granted, 44
U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1975) (Nos. 75-62, 75-66, 75-278, 75-306).
37 Riley v. Adirondack Southern School for Girls, 368 F. Supp. 392 (M.D. Fla. 1973),
appeal docketed, No. 74-1976, 5th Cir., Apr. 15, 1974.
38 The schools in these suits received no government funding nor special favors.
Section 1981 had already been applied to a private trade school in Grier v. Specialized
Skills, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 856 (W.D.N.C. 1971), but the court there held that the fact that
the trade school had to be licensed by the state and that all such state-licensed schools
were segregated (two out of five all black) impermissibly involved the state in the affairs
of the school. Further, some of the school's students received federal aid.
39 Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1974); Brown v. Gaston County
Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972); Young v.
International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757, 758-60 (3d Cir. 1971); Boudreaux v. Baton
Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011, 1016-17 (5th Cir. 1971) (following San-
ders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097, 1099-1100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 948 (1971)); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476, 481-84 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
40 Scott v. Young, 421 F.2d 143 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970) (alternate
holding); see Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, 495 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974) (swimming
club's rules were alleged to be racial subterfuges).
41 95 S. Ct. 1716, 1720 (1975).Johnson held that § 1981 is a remedy forjob discrimina-
tion entirely separate from Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et
seq. (1970), and that therefore an action in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion under that title does not toll the statute of limitations applicable to § 1981.
42 But see Buchanan, Federal Regulation of Private Racial Prejudice: A Study of Law in
Search of Morality, 56 IowA L. REV. 473, 506-12 (1971).
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the Fifth Circuit held in Cook v. Advertiser Co.4 3 that a standing
opportunity to publish social notices in a newspaper, without
charge, does not amount to an offer of a unilateral contract, so
that one denied publication on racial grounds has no cause of
action under section 1981. Neither whites nor blacks, the court
reasoned, can claim a contract right to have notices published.
44
Apart from McCrary, only district courts have considered the
right of privacy as a principle possibly limiting section 198 1.45 A
reason for limiting application of the section is to prevent the
danger, somewhat overstated by the McCrary dissenters, that
unwilling co-contractors will be coerced into any and every vari-
ety of contract,46 thus changing the effective definition of con-
tract from a meeting of the minds (subject to legitimate govern-
ment regulation) to a meeting of the minds on all subjects except
race.47 The logic of this line of reasoning has been considered by
many commentators48 and will be discussed below in terms of
the conflict between section 1981 and first amendment and re-
lated constitutional liberties.
B. Associational and Privacy Rights
The Supreme Court has never addressed itself to the prob-
lem of clearly defining or even stating a formula for associational
43 458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972), aff'g 323 F. Supp. 1212 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
44 For purposes of this Comment, Judge Wisdom's concurring opinion is more in-
teresting than the majority opinion. Judge Wisdom's conclusion that the Advertiser's
solicitation of information about social events and responses to that solicitation did not
constitute a contract was
shaped by, if not compelled by, the First Amendment's guarantee of a free
press. It is most unlikely that any court in our land could constitutionally en-
force a promise by a newspaper to publish any particular item of news [citing
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)]. Even if a newspaper stooped to sell its
news coverage for hard cash, I suppose the most a frustrated buyer would be
entitled to would be a refund of the dollars he had parted with.
458 F.2d at 1123 (Wisdom, J., concurring). But see Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) ("commercial speech," here in the
form of sex-segregated want ads, not protected by the first amendment) (5-4 decision,
Burger, C.J., and Douglas, Stewart and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
45 See, e.g., Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182,
1198 (D. Conn. 1974) ( § 1981 found unconstitutional if read with no limits, but "saved"
by "harmonization" with the private club exemption of Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970), by exempting private clubs from § 1981 as well); Sims v.
Order of United Commercial Travelers, 343 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1972).
46 Text accompanying note 23 supra.
47 Of course, it can be said that any limitation on power to bargain inserts an element
of unwillingness into the subsequent deal. Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905);
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (discredited "substantive due process" cases).
4 8 E.g., Buchanan, supra note 42; Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination:
The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 COLUM. L.
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and privacy rights. The following will point out those decisions
that may be useful in synthesizing a definition of these rights
needed to dispose of the cases at hand.
1. The Right of Association
49
Except for "the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances," 50
freedom of association is not specifically set forth in the Con-
stitution. The development of associational rights in the Su-
preme Court has been largely dependent on the kind of situa-
tion in which the issue has arisen. It is not clear in any given case
precisely what considerations the Court will take into account, in
developing the doctrine further. The factual settings of McCrary
and Riley have not yet been dealt with by the Court.
At the very least, private schools have a right to exist and to
teach whatever subjects and doctrines not "manifestly inimical to
the public welfare" they wish.5 1 The right to control their own
activities is not unlimited, but is susceptible to reasonable regula-
tion concerning the compulsory teaching of certain subjects and
the qualifications of teachers. 52 (Private schools do not, however,
have the right to discriminate on the basis of race while receiving
federal or state assistance.)53 Whatever additional rights private
schools may have must be deduced from decisions regarding
associational and privacy rights in other contexts and from gen-
eral constitutional and ethical principles.
The right to associate for political purposes has been de-
fined broadly and has been given protection in a number of
contexts. One case in which the right to associate was raised,
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,54 held that a nonsubversive
political organization need not reveal its membership list to the
REV. 449 (1974); Is Section 1981 the Answer?, supra note 3, at 1153-75; Private Education,
supra note 3.
49 See generally C. RicE, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (1962); Emerson, Freedom of Associa-
tion and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964); Nathanson, Freedom of Association and
the Quest for Internal Security: Conspiracy from Dennis to Dr. Spock, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 153
(1970).
50 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
51 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923) (both striking down statutes forbid-
ding teaching languages to school children of certain ages).
52 268 U.S. at 534.
53 
E.g., Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974); Norwood v. Harrison,
413 U.S. 455 (1973); Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd per curiam sub
nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218
(1964).
54 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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government when there is some possibility that doing so would
expose some of its members to adverse community pressures
and when the state could accomplish its aim in requiring such a
list less intrusively. Alabama proposed to use the lists to deter-
mine violations of the state's foreign corporation statutes. On the
other hand, in Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control
Board55 the Court upheld the federal government's interest in
requiring Communist Party members to register with the gov-
ernment on the basis of a legislative finding that foreign-
dominated Communist activities posed a substantial threat to the
national security.5 6 Even when one is a member of a subversive
organization, however, he must specifically intend to promote
such of the organization's aims as are illegal if he is to be
penalized.5
7
Important to an analysis of the private school segregation
issue is the broad scope that has been given the term "political
association." The Supreme Court has not limited the term "polit-
ical activity" to the narrowly electoral, or even to the promotion
of ideology through speech and associated media. NAACP v.
Button58 held that a Virginia antichamperty law could not apply
to the NAACP's efforts to secure legal assistance for poor blacks,
because of the organization's associational rights.
The NAACP is not a conventional political party; but
the litigation it assists, while serving to vindicate the
legal rights of members of the American Negro com-
munity, at the same time and perhaps more impor-
tantly, makes possible the distinctive contribution of a
minority group to the ideas and beliefs of our society.
For such a group, association for litigation may be the
most effective form of political association.5"
Against this associational right, the state's claimed interest in
preventing misuse of the courts could not stand. °
55 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
56 A subsequent case rendered the registration requirement invalid on the ground
that it violated the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Albertson v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965). In Aptheker v. Secretary of State,
378 U.S. 500 (1964), the denial of passports to Communist Party members who failed to
register was invalidated for overbreadth, in part because it could be applied to one who
did not know or did not intend the Party's illegal aims.
"7 See Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937).
58 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
59Id. at 431.
60 Justice Douglas, concurring, noted that the purpose of the law in question was to
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An individual may not be punished for teaching a doctrine,
even a code of violence, absent a clear and present danger.
6 1
Presumably an individual or a group may not be punished for
banding together to learn such a doctrine or even to spread it.
One court of appeals has held that protection of political associa-
tion requires that segregated political groups be given the same
opportunity to use state-owned facilities on a temporarily exclu-
sive basis as is given other political groups.
62
Much of the law of free association concerns governmental
restrictions on public employees. The leading cases permitting
such restrictions, United Public Workers v. Mitchell63 and United
States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter
Carriers,64 upheld enforcement of the Hatch Act, restricting the
right of federal employees to engage in partisan political ac-
tivities. Other cases, however, have protected the rights of gov-
ernment employees to engage in associational activities that are
political in a broad sense of that term but are not partisan in the
sense of the dominant two-party system. United States v. Robe1
65
held that Congress cannot make it a crime to belong to an offi-
cially designated Communist-action organization while working
in a defense plant; but the Court conceded that the result might
be different if the statute required proof of specific intent to
engage in the unlawful activities such an organization might
promote. 66 But absent a strong countervailing governmental in-
terest the right of public employees to associate may not be in-
fringed. This is clear from Shelton v. Tucker,67 in which the Court
held that Arkansas may not require its schoolteachers to file
annual affidavits, listing all current and recent organizational
ties, for the purpose of assessing the teachers' fitness.
There is also some constitutional protection of social, non-
political association, but whether it is as great as protection of
resist the mandate of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) by penalizing the
NAACP because it promotes desegregation. Id. at 445.
61 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Justices Black and Douglas would not
recognize a "clear and present danger" exception. Id. at 449-57 (Black & Douglas, JJ.,
concurring).
62 National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir. 1973)
(en banc) (successor to the American Nazi Party was allowed to rent a public school
auditorium, often used for political discussion, for a public meeting and a private meet-
ing, over the objections of the county that this activity would impermissibly involve it in
discriminatory action because blacks and Jews were to be excluded).
63 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
64 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
65 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
6 6 Id. at 262-63.
67 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
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political association is unclear. The strongest recent support for
such rights is provided in two cases concerning appropriate
means of implementing desegregation orders. In Norwood v.
Harrison the Court speculated that "the Constitution may compel
toleration of private discrimination .... ,,68 However, the Court
did not conclude that the Constitution does in fact compel such
toleration.69 The Court voiced this concern in Gilmore v. City of
Montgomery, in refusing to restrict certain uses of public parks by
segregated groups: "The freedom to associate applies to the be-
liefs we share, and to those we consider reprehensible. 7 0 This
result was based on the absence of state action, but the Court
had in mind potential encroachments upon discriminatory
groups' associational rights. Significantly, the Supreme Court has
not yet held these rights to include the right to exist as a racially
discriminatory group,71 although several lower courts have
done so.
72
There is a hint, but only a hint, that associational rights do
not include a right to associate on the basis of race or, alterna-
tively, that such associations merit less protection than others
because of the spirit of the post-Civil War amendments. The
McCrary opinion states that some schools may be "so private as to
have a discernible rule of exclusivity which is inoffensive to §
198l1. 73 The principle of exlusivity would have to be racially
neutral, however, to be inoffensive, as, for example, if siblings
retained a tutor for their children.7 4
Shelley v. Kraemer7 5 and Barrows v. Jackson7 6 lend support to
the position that segregation is not a protected form of associa-
tion. A group of people may agree to associate by living together
as a community and may use the device of enforceable property
convenants to ensure the group's cohesiveness. (For example,
covenants requiring that lawns be mowed regularly and houses
maintained can be seen as an effort by the co-covenantors to
68 413 U.S. 445, 463 (1973).
69 But see Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
70 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974).
71 Note that the question of a club's right to exist as a segregated organization is
distinct from what rights extent clubs have.
72 See cases cited note 45 supra.
73 McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. granted, 96 S.
Ct. 354 (1975) (Nos. 75-62, 75-66, 75-278, 75-306).
74 515 F.2d at 1088-89.
75 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
76 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
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associate only with people who care about their surroundings. 77 )
Race is not a characteristic that the group may use in defining
itself, however, if it wishes to enforce a convenant restricting the
sale of property. Since Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,78 even volun-
tary cooperation in maintaining a segregated community is im-
permissible, because a prospective purchaser has a remedy
against the discriminatory seller. Indeed, it is possible that the
right of association, "penumbral" to begin with, is dimmed
further by the post-Civil War amendments. This Comment is
concerned with more than the shadowing of the right of associa-
tion by the post-Civil War amendments; it is concerned with the
possibility of the right's total eclipse.
2. The Right of Privacy
Cases defining the growing area of privacy7 9 or what might
be described as autonomy"0 of person and family also contribute
to the theory of the rights of private schools. This area was
recognized in 1925 in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,8' in which the
Court invalidated a state law requiring children to attend public
school because the law abridged "the liberty of parents . . .to
direct the upbringing and education of [their] children .... 82
The notion has undergone its greatest development in four cases
decided in the last decade, Griswold v. Connecticut,83 Stanley v.
Georgia,84 Eisenstadt v. Baird,8 5 and Roe v. Wade.86 The principle
common to these cases is that certain aspects of one's life are so
personal that direct governmental encroachment is constitution-
ally impermissible.
For purposes of analyzing the privacy problems in the pri-
vate school setting, Griswold is the most important of the four
7 Of course this might also evidence a financial concern with maintaining property
values.
78 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
79 See generally Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1974); War-
ren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); Symposium-Privacy, 31
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 251 (1966); Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal
Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 670, 697-705 (1973) [hereinafter cited as On Privacy).
80 See notes 142-77 infra & accompanying text.
81 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
82 Id. at 534-35.
83 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (decision to use contraceptives is a penumbral right for mar-
ried couples).
84 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right to have pornography in the privacy of one's home).
85 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (equal protection requires that the availability of contracep-
tives not be dependent on marital status).
86 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion).
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decisions because it protects a particular intrafamilial relation-
ship, marriage, from certain governmental interference. The
Court in Griswold held that the state may not deny to a married
couple the right to choose whether or not to use contra-
ceptives.8 7 The Court based its holding on several constitutional
principles, primarily the first amendment and its penumbras but
also the third, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments,
all of which contain guarantees against governmental interfer-
ence with various aspects of an individual's life. The majority
relied on Pierce to support its holding, 88 suggesting that in-
trafamilial relationships other than the conjugal one share the
same type of protection.
The other three decisions bear less directly on the privacy
rights accorded specific family relationships, but do concern the
general right of individuals to be free from governmental inter-
ference in matters of personal choice, particularly those related
to sexuality. In Stanley v. Georgia,89 the Court held that although
publication and sale of pornography may be unprotected by the
first amendment, the possession of obscene material for use in
the privacy of one's home is protected as part of the right of
freedom of thought. In Roe v. Wade,90 as in Griswold, the decision
to have a child was considered, this time in light of the woman's
particular problems as a childbearer. The private nature of this
decision was found to outweigh many state interests previously
believed to be of overriding importance. In Eisenstadt,91 the right
of unmarried persons to the same freedom of access to con-
traceptives as that possessed by married people was established.
That these cases do not bear directly on the relationship
between parent and child and the decisionmaking aspects of that
relationship does not imply that the parent-child relationship is
not protected by the Constitution. To the contrary, Pierce
demonstrates that the relationship is protected and Griswold,
Stanley, Eisenstadt, and Roe v. Wade reinforce and expand the
Pierce approach by upholding penumbral rights of privacy in
intimate relationships or deeply personal choices.92
87 Note that there are limits even to this freedom, for there is little question that
contraception may be limited in certain ways, as by prohibition of a harmful drug.
88 381 U.S. at 481-83.
89 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
90 410 U.S. 43 (1973).
91 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
92 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the parent-child relationship was
protected against the state's interference in the context of a decision concerning how
much education was enough for the child. That decision was based primarily on the right
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III. LIMITING PRINCIPLES FOR SECTION 1981
The ultimate resolution of the issues raised in McCrary and
Riley will depend on the limiting principles devised for use in
section 1981 cases. This section will deal with several possible
principles for limiting the section, raising issues of both statutory
and constitutional dimension.
A. The "Door Opener" Argument
The dissenting judges in McCrary asserted that in the private
school context "[t]he contract aspect of the situation is minor and
incidental and serves no purpose other than as a door opener in
the present case to bring independent schools within the scope
of § 1981."93 This is so, the dissent believed, because the
student-teacher relationship is one of status rather than contract
and is "related to the contract concept in the same way that the
status of husband and wife may be said to grow out of a contract
.... "94 These situations were distinguished from that of Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co. 95 because the property transactions denied in
Jones in violation of section 1982 were "purely commercial," with
a basis in contract and not in status.
96
It is clear, however, that there is a more than token contrac-
tual basis in the relationship between a school on the one hand
and a parent or child 97 on the other. The parent enters into a
binding contract with the school to pay for services and perhaps
to the free exercise of religion, however, and absent the religious element it is unlikely
that the Court would hold that a parent may disregard a compulsory attendance law. See
generally Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
Of course, other cases exist defining the protection given to one or another aspect of
the individual's private life, most notably protection from criminal investigations that
invade one's privacy, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967). These cases add to the spirit of the law bearing on the cases under
discussion, but are not directly relevant to the problem of the freedom to be unencum-
bered in intimate relationships and associations.
93 515 F.2d at 1093 (Russell, Field & Widener, JJ., dissenting).
94 Id. at 1092-93 (Russell, Field &Widener, JJ., dissenting).
95 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra.
96 515 F.2d at 1093 (Russell, Field & Widener, JJ., dissenting).
97 In the ordinary case, the child does not contract directly with the teacher, but this
is essentially because the child makes none of his own contracts in matters of substance.
Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), suggests
that the child has some right to determine whether and where he wishes to go to school.
Id. at 244-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). If the child's role as a decisionmaker is
accepted, the contract between the young student and the teacher clearly will be estab-
lished. The corresponding relationship of an adult student to a college, for instance,
involves the acceptance of mutual obligations and rights and not merely the subordina-
tion of the student to the teacher. In the case of the young student this consensual
relationship is not as clear, because of the seeming split of the child's legal personality
between himself and his parents.
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to perform other duties (such as ensuring the promptness and
neat appearance of his child) in return for the provision of edu-
cation. The period during which a student applies for admission
and chooses among schools is clearly a contract formation peri-
od. Before the relationship of teacher and pupil ensues, an
agreement to teach and to send one's child to learn, in return for
a consideration, is required. Providing teachers, curricula, class-
rooms, and so forth are all undeniably contractual responsibil-
ities of the school. A contractual arrangement thus forms the
basis of all our private educational institutions, except perhaps a
few foundlings' schools. 8
As noted above,99 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
found, in Cook v. Advertiser Co. ,'o that a standing opportunity to
place social notices in a newspaper does not constitute an offer
of a unilateral contract, because the Advertiser charged no fee
for stories appearing on the society page and persons who sub-
mitted information for publication had no rights against the
newspaper. Thus, a black who was denied publication of her
announcement in the portion of the paper available to whites did
not have a cause of action under section 1981. However, a par-
ent who pays to enroll his child in a private school certainly has
rights against the educators who operate the institution. The
opportunity to obtain these rights is denied to a person who is
refused a contract because he is nonwhite. The application of the
contract concept to the private school situation is not the ma-
nipulation of a formal relationship for the purpose of opening a
door to government regulation, but rather is a recognition of a
substantial relationship.
B. Autonomy in the Context of Private Schools
1. The Decision in Cook v. Hudson
The supposed right to participate in discriminatory practices
has arisen in a setting different from but related to the attacks
on segregated private schools under section 1981. In Cook v.
Hudson'0 three public school teachers asserted a right under
98 Marriage represents a completely different case. There is a legal contract of mar-
riage into which the two parties enter, but that is not the foundation of the relationship.
The circumstance of marriage would for the most part exist in the absence of any
conception of contract and perhaps in the absence of any organized society at all.
99 Text accompanying note 43 supra.
100 458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1973).
101 365 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Miss.), affd, 511 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1973), petitionfor cert.
filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3230 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1975) (No. 75-503).
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section 1983102 to send their children to segregated private
schools despite a school board policy denying their right to do
so. The Board of Education of Calhoun County, Mississippi,
acting pursuant to a desegregation order, 10 3 adopted an unwrit-
ten policy (not required by the desegregation order but ap-
proved by the Justice Department) of not hiring or rehiring
teachers, residing in the county, who sent their children to a
school other than a county public school.' 0 4 Before the 1968
desegregation order there had never been a private school in the
county; after the order only one, the segregated "Calhoun
Academy," was established. The district court in Hudson found
that the Academy had been established "to provide a haven for
segregated education."'01 5 Subsequent to adoption of this policy,
the plaintiff teachers in Hudson were not rehired, solely because
they would not comply with the board rule.
06
The school board adopted its policy to ensure that the
faculty would be committed to a desegregated school system
and that students would not "perceive rejection . . . from a
teacher whose own children attend a nearby racially segregated
school." 10 7 Both the district court and the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit upheld the validity of the policy and the dismis-
sal of the teachers, but on different grounds. The district court
held that the board policy was valid as applied because the only
private school option was a segregated school. 10 8 The rule was
rationally related to the legitimate state purpose of achieving
effective, integrated public education, and therefore did not
deny the teachers equal protection. 109 The first amendment as-
sociational rights of public employees, the court determined,
102 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
103 United States v. Calhoun County Bd. of Educ., No. WC 6637 (N.D. Miss., Aug. 9,
1968), cited in 365 F. Supp. at 856.
104 511 F.2d at 745. Mississippi provides no tenure for public school teachers. Id. n. 1.




7 Id. at 860, quoted in 511 F.2d at 746.
108 365 F. Supp. at 859. The district court specifically left open the question whether
such a rule would be valid if the private school in question offered a racially neutral
educational advantage not available in the public schools. The court found that the
purpose of the board rule was limited to dealing with the situation at hand, id. at 859-60,
and did not consider the question of overbreadth.109/d. at 860.
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may sometimes be abridged if there is "clear justification" for
doing so, such as the need to vindicate the fourteenth amend-
ment rights of the county's schoolchildren who had been the
victims of past segregation.110
The court of appeals affirmed, its order accompanied by a
per curiam statement of the case and three separate opinions on
the law. In voting to affirm, Judge Coleman cited Supreme
Court decisions upholding the right of the federal government
to prohibit certain political activities among its employees,"' as-
serting that the government policy in question need only be a
good faith effort to maintain an effective school system. 1 2 Judge
Roney voted to "affirm the district court's conclusion that the
school authorities acted within their discretionary authority" in
attempting to lessen the detrimental influence of the existence of
the Calhoun Academy on the integrated public school system.
He added that the case did "not have broad implications" outside
its context of court-ordered desegregation." 3
Perceiving the issue differently, Judge Clark dissented be-
cause the board's rule imposed a "substantial burden upon the
exercise of a fundamental right" without sufficient justifi-
cation. 1 4 He objected to the finding that this policy advanced
the purpose of eradicating discrimination. In Judge Clark's view
the district judge gave too much weight to speculative sociologi-
cal testimony. 1 5 This weak evidence, Judge Clark concluded,
should not override the teachers' otherwise protected rights of
association and privacy.
2. Balancing Constitutional Interests in Cook v. Hudson
If, as Judge Coleman stated," 6 the Hatch Act cases ade-
quately resolve the problems raised in Cook v. Hudson, then Hud-
110 Id. at 859 (citing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 572-73 (1968)
(Board of Education could fire teachers only for speech that would "have impeded the
teacher's performance of his daily duties in the classroom or to have interfered with the
regular operation of the school generally"); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422
(1956); Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972
(1973) (first amendment rights opposed by state interest in employee discipline)).
111 511 F.2d at 748 (Coleman, J.) (citing United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S.
75 (1947); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548 (1973) (reaffirming Mitchell)). In both cases, the first amendment rights of
employees were viewed in the context of the government's power to ensure its efficient,
honest administration under the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (1970).
112 511 F.2d at 749 (Coleman, J.).
113Id. at 750 (Roney, J.).
11
4 Id. at 751 (Clark, J., dissenting).
115 Id. at 752-53, 756-57 (Clark, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 748 (Coleman, J.).
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son has little relevance to the issues raised in McCrary and Riley.
The guiding principle of the Hatch Act decisions is the theory
that the state may have an overriding interest in regulating the
speech and associations of those who voluntarily enter into pub-
lic employment. That principle sheds little light on the rights of
parents and teachers in the private school context. The Hatch
Act cases do not, however, completely dispose of the question
presented in Hudson. Instead, the Hudson decision should be
viewed as depending on a balancing of the relevant first and
fourteenth amendment interests, and thus is illuminating in con-
sidering McCrary and Riley.
There are significant factual distinctions between the United
States Civil Service and a local school system and between reg-
ulating certain types of partisan political speech and electioneer-
ing and regulating association related to the right to bring up
one's children as one sees fit.1 7 There are also distinctions be-
tween the nature of the government interests protected by the
Hatch Act and those of the school board in Hudson. These dis-
tinctions suggest that although the general balancing approach
should not be abandoned, there is insufficient basis for the sug-
gestion by Judge Coleman in Hudson that associational and pri-
vacy interests in segregated private schools are easily overridden.
In the Hatch Act, Congress exercised its power to protect
the integrity of the federal government from a widely perceived
threat of corruption. This is a general governmental power; one
can hardly conceive of a government that does not possess it to
some degree. Yet it is a special power in the sense that its exer-
cise is fundamental to the survival of government, though it does
not advance any particular aim of government. The peculiar
nature of this power precludes unexamined reliance on the
Hatch Act cases to solve the problems raised by encroachment
on civil liberties in the advancement of less basic governmental
interests.
Were the local government's power to run an effective
school system the only issue in Hudson, dissenting Judge Clark
would have a powerful argument that the school board's policy
should be invalidated. The important rights of association and
familial privacy should not be infringed by a general govern-
"'7 The parent is responsible for the child's education even though the state has
established schools and could conceivably have assumed responsibility. See Pierce v. Soci-
ety of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925): "[T]hose who nurture [the child] and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations."
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mental interest in operating schools, especially where, as here,
the evidence indicates only indirectly that the policy infringing
those rights advances the government's claimed interest."18
There is, however, a stronger characterization of the
county's case. The nature of the power exercised by the school
board is not significantly less important than the federal power
underlying the Hatch Act. Besides having an interest in running
its schools well, the school board in Hudson was acting to imple-
ment a court order requiring it to enforce the fourteenth
amendment rights of the county's black schoolchildren. This
special concern for effectively establishing the priority of equal
protection in the public school system elevates the justification
for the board's exercise of power to a level comparable to that
underlying the Hatch Act decisions. Chief Judge Keady recog-
nized the importance of the school district's equal protection
concerns in the trial court opinion: "Conceding there must be
clear justification for curtailing or limiting First Amendment
rights, nevertheless, plaintiffs' rights as parents may not be con-
sidered in isolation, and to the exclusion of other constitutional
demands of equal, if not greater, magnitude." 119
The existence of this fourteenth amendment equal protec-
tion interest of the county schoolchildren as a basis for the
board's policy places the teachers' associational and familial
rights in conflict with strong forces indeed. 20 If the board's
policy had been invalidated in Hudson, the fourteenth amend-
ment rights of those protected by the 1968 integration order
might have been infringed.' 2
1
A conflict between constitutional rights such as the one that
occurred in Hudson is rare but by no means unique. Justice
Douglas attempted to avoid a similar conflict in his famous dis-
sent in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis. 122 By separating the issue of
118 511 F.2d at 752-53 (Clark, J., dissenting).
119 365 F. Supp. at 859. The opinion continued (quoting Ullman v. United States,
350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956)):"As no constitutional guaranty enjoys preference, so none
should suffer subordination or deletion."
120 The 1968 desegregation order issued pursuant to the fourteenth amendment is
of course in accord with the spirit of the thirteenth amendment as well.
121 Of course, this does not vitiate Judge Clark's argument concerning the tenuous-
ness of the psychological evidence supporting the board's policy. But psychological and
sociological evidence has been important in showing harm under the fourteenth amend-
ment. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Where the issue is whether the
fourteenth amendment interests of a large number of schoolchildren will be served by a
given policy, psychological evidence may be the only kind adducible.
122 407 U.S. 163, 179-84 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas followed the
dictum in his opinion for the Court in Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966): "A
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association from that of state action, he could affirm the right of
individuals to associate with complete freedom but deny the
right of discriminatory associations to receive significant gov-
ernment benefits available in limited supply. A majority of the
Supreme Court considered this approach in Gilmore v. City of
Montgomery,123 in which segregated school groups were enjoined
from the exclusive use of recreational facilities, in city parks in
order to guarantee full implementation of public park desegre-
gation orders. The private segregated organizations were not
enjoined from using the park, however, although the Court
acknowledged that upon a finding of "impairment of an out-
standing school desegregation order" such a result might
be warranted on remand.
The Court was aware of the implications of its position even
though no private group was ordered to integrate:
It should be obvious that the exclusion of any person or
group... from public facilities infringes upon the free-
dom of the individual to associate as he chooses. ...
[H]owever, we must also be aware that the very exercise
of that freedom to associate by some may serve to in-
fringe that freedom for others. Invidious discrimination
takes its own toll on the freedom to associate, and it is
not subject to affirmative constitutional protection when
it involves state action. 124
The Court recognized that associational rights may conflict both
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rights, 25 while the dissenters in that case characterized them
only as associational. 126 The Hudson dissent spoke of the "per-
sonal freedom as parents to choose the academic environment in
which their children will be educated," a freedom that may be
"viewed as a part of a citizen's Fourteenth Amendment liberty or
First Amendment freedom of association or a combination of
both."'
27
This disparity of definition arises not from the intrinsic
complexity of the interest claimed by the schoolteacher parents
(one has an intuitive feel for what it is); but rather from the fact
that the Supreme Court has never clearly formulated a doctrine
of associational rights. Only in Pierce v. Society of Sisters128 did the
Supreme Court consider doctrines of association and privacy in a
context analogous to the one under consideration here. In Pierce
the Court found these rights guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment. 2 9 It must be noted, however, that Pierce was de-
cided during the peak of the "substantive due process" era, when
state interests were frequently afforded little weight.
Parents' decisions concerning the education of their children
involve both political and social aspects of first amendment in-
terests. Parents' decisions concerning the education of their
offspring are political within the broad meaning of "politics"
adopted by the Supreme Court in NAACP v. Button. 130 Certainly,
discussion of educational matters is protected as discussion of a
subject of public interest.' 3 ' Many parents send their children to
school not only because of compulsory attendance laws, but also
with the hope that education will enable their children to make a
"distinctive contribution"'' 32 to society. Without doubt those who
operate schools also hope this will be one result of their efforts.
The decision to enroll one's child in a private school "presenting
ideas or having educational methods or practices which are not
available in the public schools"' 33 may be viewed as a political
choice, as may the decision to establish such a school. Operating
125 515 F.2d at 1087.
126 515 F.2d at 1094-96 (Russell, Field & Widener, JJ., dissenting).
127 511 F.2d at 750 (Clark, J., dissenting).
128 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
129 268 U.S. at 534-35. The Pierce Court found the rights in the general principle of
"liberty" and did not identify or place them more specifically. See note 164 infra &
accompanying text.
130 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
131 Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968).
132 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963).
131 McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1087 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. granted,
96 S.Ct. 354 (1975) (Nos. 75-62, 75-66, 75-278, 75-306).
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private schools, at least when they do not transgress state statutes
and regulations reasonable under Pierce,13 4 legitimately presents
the public with a choice of educational alternatives. The indi-
vidual should be as free to choose among these alternatives as he
is to choose among the proposed policies of candidates for elec-
tion to school boards.
The associational right claimed by the parents is also social.
A parent may choose a private school for his child partly on the
basis of the sort of people with whom the parent wishes the child
to associate. A parent may believe that a child's social environ-
ment is important to character development. Until Riley and
McCrary, no case had suggested that in the absence of state ac-
tion the power of the state to regulate education included the
power to prescribe who must be allowed to attend a particular
private school. Pierce limits the social setting that one may seek
out in a private school only to the extent of permitting the state
to require that teachers be of good moral character. 35
The right of social association is part and parcel of the asser-
tedly political right discussed above. But in addition, given the
absence of support for the position that the regulatory power of
the state permits it to prescribe which students must be admitted
to which private schools, the school's choice of the composition
of its student body is a legitimate choice of educational methods.
If the school has the right to present such policies to the public,
then the public has a correlative right to consider those policies
in choosing a school.
In addition to these associational rights, plaintiffs' rights of
familial privacy, akin to those raised in Griswold,'3 6 Roe v.
Wade, 137 Stanley v. Georgia,138 and Eisenstadt,139 are involved in
Hudson. Although these cases all center on the problem of sexu-
ality, their logic need not end there. Indeed, Griswold builds the
right of sexual freedom in part on the freedom to choose a
134 The Pierce Court did not question
the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, surpervise
and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of
proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character
and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship
must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the
public welfare.
268 U.S. at 534.
135 Id.
136 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
137 410 U.S. 43 (1973).
138 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
139 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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school in Pierce.'40 Sex is but one of a number of concerns of
such central importance to the familial relationship that it should
be unregulated by government.14' The choice of educational pol-
icy is fundamental to the relationship between parent and child
and to the parent's responsibility for the child. It is an intensely
personal matter which in very large part should be between par-
ent and child, and eventually between them and the school.
In summary, the right asserted by the plaintiffs in Hudson to
send their children to a school of their choice consists of at least
(1) an interest in familial privacy, including the freedom to bring
up a child as one chooses, (2) an interest in the social association
of both themselves and their children, and (3) quasi-political in-
terests in effectively supporting a favored educational philoso-
phy. When these rights are viewed together, the real issue is the
"autonomy"'142 of the parent. Professor Henkin has written:
Primarily and principally the new Right of Privacy is a
zone of prima facie autonomy, of presumptive immu-
nity from regulation, in addition to that established by
the first amendment. The zone, Justice Blackmun told
us, ... consists of 'personal rights' that can be deemed
'fundamental,' that are 'implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty.' The right has 'some extension' to mar-
riage, . . .family relations and parental autonomy. But
we will know which rights are and which are not within
143the zone only case by case ....
Professor Henkin's formulation of autonomy focuses
primarily on the four "sexual privacy" cases,'144 yet his analysis
applies equally well to a much larger set of rights including those
examined above.' 45 The courts have denominated as "associa-
tional" the rights upheld in NAACP v. Alabana ex rel.
140 381 U.S. at 482-83.
141 On the other hand, not even the sexual relations of the family are wholly immune
from state regulation. Prohibitions of incest, for example, still stand. See, e.g., Miss. CoDE
ANN. § 93-1-1 (1972).
142 This name for the collection of constitutional rights was suggested in Henkin,
supra note 79, and On Privacy, supra note 79, as a useful device for analyzing the real
nature of the rights involved in Griswold, Eisenstadt, Stanley v. Georgia, and Roe v. Wade.
Henkin notes that these "familial" rights are less matters of "privacy" in the traditional
sense of keeping one's affairs secret, than of "autonomy," meaning the ability to act free
of governmental interference.
143 Henkin, supra note 79, at 1425-26.
144 Cases cited notes 136-39 supra & accompanying text.
141 Text accompanying notes 49-92 supra.
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Patterson,146 NAACP v. Button,' 47 and Shelton v. Tucker,148 but they
can easily be seen as rights of autonomy in Professor Henkin's
sense. The rights asserted by the NAACP on behalf of its mem-
bers in Alabama ex rel. Patterson and the rights asserted in Shelton
are rights of privacy in the traditional sense of the right to keep
information about oneself secret from the government. In both
cases, however, the key support for the holding was the conclu-
sion that governmental knowledge of the association in question
impaired the individual's autonomy by subjecting him to the pos-
sibility of governmental or other intimidation. 49 Similarly, the
limitation of autonomy in childbearing was the central issue in
Roe v. Wade. 150 Further, while Button involved the ability of the
NAACP as an organization to catalyze litigation, the basis of the
holding was that the members of the organization had a right to
be free from government interference when advancing their be-
liefs in this manner.
As Professor Henkin states, the zone in question is only one
of "prima facie autonomy, of presumptive immunity from
regulation"; 151 this holds true for the expanded zone of au-
tonomy suggested here as well. The state's interest in the
mother's decision to abort grows with the fetus.' 52 Similarly, Gil-
more v. City of Montgomery concerned the point at which restric-
tions can be imposed on the autonomy of individuals to practice
segregation in private groups.' 53 In Pierce the parents were pre-
sumed to have autonomy in the decision where to send their
children to school, subject to reasonable regulation of certain
aspects of education. In Shelton v. Tucker the Court did not fore-
close the possibility of inquiry into specific memberships of
teachers.'
54
The theoretical objection to this consolidation of concepts is
that the concepts do not necessarily share a common basis. The
Supreme Court in Griswold found the right of marital privacy (or
autonomy) in the "peripheral rights" that emanate from the first
amendment.'5 5 The reasoning in Alabama ex rel. Patterson was
146 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
147 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
148 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
149 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
150 410 U.S. 43 (1973).
151 Henkin, supra note 79, at 1425.
152 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-65 (1973).
153 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974).
154 364 U.S. at 487-88.
155 381 U.S. at 482-84.
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similar.' 56 However, the Court in Griswold noted that the right
there discovered was not an exclusive first amendment right but
was also supported by the third, fourth, fifth, and ninth
amendments. 157 The right in Roe v. Wade is less securely tied to
the first amendment; Justice Blackmun stated 158 that different
cases tie different parts of the right to different constitutional
provisions, the first, 5 9 fourth, fifth, 60 ninth,16' and four-
teenth162  amendments, along with the general concept of
penumbral rights. 163 Pierce itself fails to tie the right it assures to
any concept more definite than that of general liberty.'6 4 It is
questionable whether rights of such diverse constitutional origin
are properly subsumed under the single rubric of autonomy.
Most of the majority opinions ground the rights discovered
in the cases under discussion at least partly in the first
amendment. 65 Some, particularly Griswold and Roe v. Wade,
draw much more widely from the Constitution. The Meyer v.
Nebraska-Pierce v. Society of Sisters line of cases does not even find
partial basis in the first amendment, and these cases present facts
156 357 U.S. at 460-62.
157 381 U.S. at 481-85.
158 410 U.S. at 152.
159 Id. (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).
160 Id. (citing, inter alia, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967)).
161 Id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., con-
curring)).
162 Id. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
163 Id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965)).
164 The Pierce philosophy is best set out in a passage from Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923):
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus
guaranteed [by the fourteenth amendment], the term has received much con-
sideratron and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without
doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life,
to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children,
to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.
Among recent jurists, at least the second Justice Harlan would not have objected to this
approach, believing as he did that the proposition that all constitutionally protected
rights must be tied, however tenuously, to some provision more specific than this guaran-
tee, might permit certain rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" to be excluded
from fourteenth amendment protection. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499
(1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
165 The exception of the fourth and fifth amendment cases is not important for
purposes of this Comment. See, e.g., cases cited note 92 supra. These mostly criminal cases
generally guarantee the traditional sense of privacy, meaning the right to be free from
others' prying into one's affairs.
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most closely analogous to our current concerns. The opinions
speak generally of the fourteenth amendment guarantee of
liberty. 166 They were written during the heyday of economic
substantive due process in the 1920's, however, and their
rationales probably did not survive the demise of that doctrine.
Indeed, Meyer stresses the teacher's right to pursue a vocation,1
6
7
and Pierce emphasizes the property and business interests of the
school.1 68 The general reliance on the liberty guaranteed the
parents by the fourteenth amendment in Pierce is a close
analogue to this reasoning. Yet no one suggests that the results
of Meyer and Pierce are no longer law; the Griswold Court cited
both with approval.169 Meyer and Pierce are of course completely
compatible with the new cases proclaiming associational and pri-
vacy rights. They have been absorbed into the new jurispru-
dence of the Bill of Rights, and one suspects if they were to be
decided today, their language would closely resemble that of the
privacy and association cases. The rights identified in all these
cases remain at least presumptively with the people because of
the ninth amendment.
1 70
Another objection to this formulation of the right of au-
tonomy is that the sort of individual interests involved in sexual
relations and political association, for example, are too diverse to
be protected by a single right. Yet in each case the issue is the
same: whether in the context of one's sexual intimacies, political
associations, or other activities there is a right, arising from the
first amendment and other provisions of the Bill of Rights, to act
autonomously, that is, without government interference.' 7 ' That
we have different reasons for wishing our actions to be free of
governmental regulation in different contexts no more proves
that the autonomy sought consists of several parts than that our
having different interests in speaking freely and on different
subjects proves that there is more than one right of free speech;
' See note 164 supra.
167 262 U.S. at 400.
168 268 U.S. at 534-35.
169 381 U.S. at 481, 482; also cited with approval in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
457 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
170 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
171 The question whether this is a resurrection of substantive due process cannot be
fully explored here. It is not a revival of economic substantive due process, whose abuse
led to the decline of the doctrine. Note also that the interests of individuals in acting
autonomously in the situations under consideration have been tied to guarantees in the
Bill of Rights more specific than general liberty, or at least has been found in the
penumbras of such guarantees.
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the right to discuss politics and the right to discuss personal
matters are the same. The difference between the cases is that
there are different government interests pitted against the right
of autonomy. Thus the balances struck may be different in each
case. A theoretical basis for the right of autonomy, unified in its
central features if not in all details, has thus been laid.
4. Reconciliation of Constitutional Interests
The perennial problem of constitutional litigation is deter-
mining when an individual constitutional interest is ,outweighed
by a conflicting state interest. Many court opinions and much
commentary have sought to determine when the state interest
must be "compelling" and the means used to achieve it "neces-
sary," when the interest must be "substantial," and when it need
merely be "legitimate" and the means to achieve it "rational."
Such a determination is arduous, and, as is evidenced by the
splits of opinion on the Supreme Court, an unscientific
undertaking.
1 72
Fortunately, the facts of Hudson allow us to short-circuit
most of the inquiry because of the nature of the state's interest.
The most significant state interest involved here is the protection
of the right to equal protection of each of the black schoolchil-
dren of Calhoun County. The countervailing right of autonomy
is accurately characterized as presumptive or prima facie; it con-
tains a built-in acknowledgement of limitation. The right of
black people to equal protection of the law has never been found
less important than any other interest; 17 3 the balance struck in
Hudson does not depart from precedent.
C. Autonomy and Thirteenth Amendment Rights
in the McCrary Situation
The kind of constitutional balancing required for analysis of
17 See generally, e.g., San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (ma-
jority opinion and opinion of Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471 (1970) (majority opinion and opinion of Marshall, J., dissenting); Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336
U.S. 106 (1949); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
173 In only one modern case has state discrimination based on race been found
supportable, and that case arose in a tense wartime atmosphere. See Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The refusal of the Supreme Court in Gilmore v. City of
Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974), to grant injunctions against the nonexclusive use of
public recreation facilities by discriminatory groups was not a denial of the paramount
nature of fourteenth amendment rights, but an admission by the Court that it lacked
sufficient information to decide whether such use sufficiently implicated the city in the
discriminatory practices of the groups to constitute state action.
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Hudson'7 4 can be applied to McCray 175 and Riley' 7 6 as well. The
constitutional conflict in these two cases is even sharper than in
Hudson or Gilnore. 7 7 In the former cases two private parties
asserted conflicting individual rights, whereas in the latter cases
local governments asserted the rights of others. The method
used above to short-circuit the inquiry into degrees of constitu-
tional interest and necessity of particular means will be even
more useful here. The conflicting rights have closely analogous
constitutional bases, thus intensifying the value judgment re-
quired to dispose of these cases.
The claim of the plaintiffs in McCrary and Riley is that a
statute, section 1981 of title 42 of the United States Code, pro-
tects nonwhites from racial discrimination in contract formation
by private parties. The constitutional provision granting Con-
gress power to afford them this protection is the thirteenth
amendment, which explicitly forbids slavery but has been held to
allow Congress also to prohibit any practice that it rationally
determines imposes badges or incidents of slavery, particularly
on black persons.' 78 The power exercised by Congress here is
very specific: It is the power to enact appropriate legislation to
prevent whites from imposing badges of slavery on nonwhites by
refusing to contract with them. The right claimed by plaintiffs,
although statutory, carries the imprimatur of the thirteenth
amendment; without that amendment the right would probably
be beyond the power of Congress to guarantee, at least to the
extent that it applies to purely private discrimination.179 Con-
gress enforces the thirteenth amendment right to live as a free
individual under the jurisdiction of the United States by enforc-
ing a right to make private contracts not directly protected by
the Constitution; one personal right gives effect to another.
This relationship of rights and power is different from that
174 Cook v. Hudson, 511 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W.
3230 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1975) (No. 75-503).
175 McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. granted, 96
S. Ct. 354 (1975) (Nos. 75-62, 75-66, 75-278, 75-306).
176 Riley v. Adirondack Southern School for Girls, 368 F. Supp. 392 (M.D. Fla.
1973), appeal docketed, No. 74-1976, 5th Cir., Apr. 15, 1974.
177 Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
178 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440-43 & n.78 (1968) (overruling
prior constitutional construction of § 1981 and upholding § 1982 as a rational measure
aimed at eliminating badges and incidents of slavery). See Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 1716, 1720 (1975); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n,
410 U.S. 431, 439-40 (1973).
179 It has not been claimed that § 1981 could be enacted under the commerce power,
because the statute is not limited to contracts affecting commerce.
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usually involved in the enactment of a law. For example, when
Congress enacts a statute pursuant to the commerce power, it
may create in certain individuals statutory rights. 180 But those
rights are based on the grant of a general governmental power
to Congress, not the grant of a power to enforce a specific con-
stitutional right; the grant of the commerce power to Congress
does not create in individuals a right to a well-regulated
economy, and statutory rights granted to individuals thereunder
are not found on individual constitutional rights.' 8 ' The contrast
between the two types of powers does not suggest that absent
congressional action, there would be an independent right in
individuals to the protection now afforded by section 1981. The
Supreme Court has held that the congressional power rationally
to determine the badges and incidents of slavery is part of con-
gressional power to enforce the thirteenth amendment. 8 2 Con-
gress would not need this power if the thirteenth amendment
granted a self-executing right to be free of such badges. This
analysis of the right asserted by the McCrary and Riley plaintiffs
does not depend on whether the statute is interpreted in a
"limited" or "unlimited" fashion' 83 as long as either reading
gives effect to a power of Congress rationally exercised.
Once the courts have satisfied themselves as to the meaning and
rationality of the statute, the right guaranteed is confirmed as
a protection appropriate to the enforcement of the freedom
guaranteed by the thirteenth amendment.
The opposing right claimed by the McCrary and Riley
defendants is the right of autonomy discussed above in the con-
text of Cook v. Hudson. 184 The right has two aspects: first, there is
the right of parents to send their children to the type of school
that they see fit, which defendants assert on the parents' behalf;
second, there is the right of defendants themselves to operate a
school according to their best judgment. The first aspect is the
same as the right asserted by plaintiffs in Hudson; the second
I8 E.g., the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970), granting
workers rights to engage in certain concerted activities without fear of employer retalia-
tion.
181 For example, workers have no superstatutory (constitutional) right to be free
from economic pressure from employers; the NLRA alone creates that right, see note 180
supra.
182 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440-41 (1968).
183 See text accompanying notes 187, 200-08 infra.
184 Since the demise of economic substantive due process, the defendants cannot
claim that § 1981 interferes unreasonably with their business interest in running a school
as they wish.
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:7i4
recalls the rejected economic substantive due process theories of
Pierce and the early economic regulation cases. Education, how-
ever, is more than just a business. All education involves teaching
debatable ideas and values as well as facts; this is never truer
than in private general elementary and secondary education
offered and selected as an alternative to public school methods
or ideas.
Thus, segregated education may involve association for the
purpose of propagating a social, political, and moral philosophy,
the type of association protected in NAACP v. Button. 1
85
The rights of both plaintiffs and defendants in these cases
belong to those sets of rights necessary to the enforcement of the
rights explicitly granted individuals by the Constitution. Al-
though the rights claimed by plaintiffs were created by Congress
while those asserted by defendants were "discovered" by the
courts, the relationship of each right to the Constitution is the
same: Each buttresses the enforcement of explicit rights.
Because of this similarity, the analysis of each right in terms
of "compelling interest," "fundamentality," and so forth need
not be carried out in detail; l8 6 the relative constitutional weight
of the rights cannot be determined. Which right is more impor-
tant must be determined not in the abstract, but in the particular
factual situation, in terms of both policy and ethics.
The "unlimited" reading of section 1981 asserts that any act
of racial discrimination in the formation or performance of con-
tracts constitutes an insult to the individual against whom the
discrimination is directed, 87 sufficient to constitute a badge of
slavery. Acts of insult differ in the amount of harm done, which
determines the amount of damages awarded or the type of in-
junction granted. In all cases, however, the type of injury is
considered the same, so that all plaintiffs have the same degree
of interest in vindicating constitutional rights. This formulation
answers the McCrary dissenters' contention that certain denials of
contracts are more important than others, and that only impor-
185 371 U.S. 415 (1963); see NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449
(1958).
Moreover, the fact that neither the majority nor dissenting opinion in McCrary
distinguishes between the rights of the defendant educators and those of the parents of
the children they teach indicates that these rights are fundamentally the same. The rights
of the two groups, if not identical are at least complementary. But cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 241-46 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
186 See text accompanying note 172 supra.
18M Note that the damages awarded in McCrary were for humiliation, embarrassment,
and mental anguish. 515 F.2d at 1089.
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tant denials are forbidden by section 1981; the right to contract
to send one's child to a private school is not protected, because
an adequate integrated public school system is available. Under
the "unlimited" reading of section 1981, discrimination is for-
bidden not because it may prevent a black person from attaining
one of his goals, but because it brands the victim with the odium
of slavery. If acts of discrimination that cause the smallest actual
injury are to be regarded as equivalent to those causing the
largest, then the fact of the insult itself must be extremely pow-
erful; an interest of the discriminator in exercising any other
constitutional right will need to be extremely strong in order to
overcome it.
In McCrary the level of defendants' interest in autonomous
action is high. A restriction of autonomy in choosing a school for
one's children limits the parents' ability to associate for purposes
that are more than colorably political, to associate for social pur-
poses, and to make decisions concerning intimate familial mat-
ters, any one of which enjoys constitutional protection.
The interests of plaintiffs and defendants not only have
equally weighty constitutional bases, but they bear comparable
rank among the rights that could logically be supported by those
bases. The conflict can be resolved only by considering the con-
sequences of affirming or reversing McCrary. A reversal would
undoubtedly be formulated to allow the section 1981 and 1982
cases decided to date to remain standing. 88 Under the new for-
mulation, certain types of racial discrimination practiced by pri-
vate parties, though as invidious as any other discrimination,
could not be reached by Congress because of the shield of au-
tonomy that protects the discriminators. Protection would ex-
tend not only to discrimination involving essentially private in-
terests, such as whom one will marry or with whom one will form
a drinking club,18 9 but also to discrimination in which the in-
terests are more public, such as what type of education will be
available to the children of a community. 19° These consequences
follow if infringement of defendant's autonomy rights cannot be
justified by the need to serve the thirteenth amendment interests
" E.g., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 1716 (1975); Tillman v.
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
19 Cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
190 Cf. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974), in which the Court
expressed the concern that complete enforcement of one's right of association may dero-
gate someone else's.
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protected by section 1981. A decision upholding the rights of
defendants in McCrary would in no way reflect a return to the
doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson,19' but only the position that there
are certain types of discrimination, linked to personal prefer-
ences, that the body politic cannot and should not attempt to
eliminate.
Should the McCrary holding be affirmed, the Supreme
Court will be extending the constitutional commitment to end
racial discrimination as a relic of slavery. The question is
whether this extension would carry with it a license to invade
other constitutional liberties too deeply. The dissenters in
McCrary'92 and Hudson' 93 feared that associational values would
be infringed too easily and often in the future, for reasons that
are not compelling. The McCrary dissenters, as noted above,
feared that this decision would lead to an abuse of the concept of
contract as a door opener to governmental regulation and coer-
cion of unwilling co-contractors.' 94
These fears are justified, if at all, only in regard to the
power of Congress and the courts to eliminate racial segregation
and other badges of slavery.' 95 The logic of McCrary would not
lead to a wholesale expansion of the government's ability to in-
vade private lives. Although the McCrary holding could be used
to justify infringing certain personal rights in a substantial man-
ner solely to vindicate another's personal right, no court will
hold, for example, that a disappointed nonwhite suitor has an
action under section 1981 against a white for refusal to marry.
The interests are too intensely personal and, although narrower,
far stronger than even the parents' interests in McCrary and
Hudson.
191 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
192 515 F.2d at 1093-96 (Russell, Field & Widener, JJ., dissenting).
193 511 F.2d at 755-57 (Clark, J., dissenting).
194 515 F.2d at 1093 (Russell, Field & Widener, JJ., dissenting).
195 The post-Civil War amendments are peculiar constitutional provisions. They
were intended to protect the rights of a particular class of citizen. The thirteenth
amendment is the only constitutional provision that, in terms, guarantees individual
rights against infringement by other individuals. Originally, the rights created by Con-
gress pursuant to this amendment were meant to protect blacks from a return to slavery
after the Civil War, see Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); since then the amendment
has been used to attack various systems of involuntary labor, e.g., Selective Draft Law
Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918); Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905). No serious
attempt has been made, however, to suggest that the power to eliminate badges and
incidents of slavery extends beyond the power to eliminate all traces of racial discrimina-
tion or discrimination against some other class in danger of falling into slavery. The
holding in McCrary would permit only invasions of autonomy that can effect an end to
racial discrimination. There is no license to invade freedoms for any other purpose.
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Less extreme cases can be imagined, however, to which the
logic of McCrary might but should not automatically apply. Pro-
totypical is the case of the private club. If the interests of parents
and educators may be overridden in the name of racial integra-
tion, why should private clubs with mere social interests be al-
lowed to discriminate when their relationships are contractual in
nature? The only response is that there may not be sufficient
reason or societal interest in prohibiting such clubs from dis-
criminating. A more extreme example would arise if Congress
prohibited racial discrimination by political parties, because polit-
ical powerlessness is undeniably an accoutrement of slavery, in
cases in which the fourteenth amendment would not restrict the
party members' freedom of association. 196 Here the public in-
terest in and impact of the activity is greater, but the first
amendment protection is also greater because explicit.' 97 The
Supreme Court should acknowledge that a separate balancing of
interests must be essayed in each case. Without such a caveat,
courts may find it too easy to sacrifice rights of personal au-
tonomy on the altar of ending racial discrimination.
The reasoning of McCrary, even if carried to its extreme,
does not license destruction of any and every right to act au-
tonomously in the name of equality. Nor does it imply that un-
willing co-contractors can constitutionally be coerced into accord
for any and every reason. It does not even permit any and every
constitutional right to be invaded in order to eliminate badges of
slavery. The holding of McCrary does not even imply that Con-
gress may invade all protected areas of life in order to destroy
the badges of slavery. The majority admits that section 1981
cannot prevent the teaching of any doctrine.198 The ability of
Congress to determine and destroy badges and incidents of slav-
ery does not extend to a direct denial of a right explicitly stated
in the Constitution. A church whose dogma included racial
separatism could not be required to accept black members in
order to eliminate a badge of slavery.
Thus the holding of McCrary allows Congress and the courts
to declare: Race is not an absolutely protected basis of associa-
tion, and certain interests in freedom of action must give way
196 See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
197 Cf. O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972) (but note that this was "not a case in
which claims are made that injury arises from invidious discrimination based on race in a
primary contest within a single State," as was Terry v. Adams, id. at 4 n.1); National
Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir. 1973).
198 515 F.2d at 1087.
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before an interest in eliminating racial inequality. The thirteenth
amendment does not permit congressional interference with any
other constitutional right for any other reason. There is no
analogous constitutional provision under which Congress will be
able to use the reasoning of McCrary in order to invade protected
rights. 199 If carefully explained and expressly restricted, the
reasoning of the majority in McCrary threatens to infringe only a
limited set of personal liberties in a limited number of situations.
Under the present state of the law, in view of the vital nature of
the struggle against the relics of slavery, the delicate balance tips
in favor of affirmance.
D. A Suggested Principle of Limitation for Section 1981
and Its Application to McCrary and Riley
Although this Comment has suggested that an affirmance of
McCrary v. Runyon would not necessarily injure essential Ameri-
can liberties, such injuries could conceivably result from a broad
construction of McCrary and section 1981. An alternative solu-
tion, rather than simple affirmance or reversal, might better pro-
tect all the interests at stake. For this reason, a construction of
section 1981 will be suggested that allows it to operate in most
cases in which its effect would be most useful but limits its poten-
tial for abuse.
The conventional analysis of section 1981 rests on the de-
termination that any racial discrimination in the formation or
performance of a contract humiliates the rejected party, and that
the Constitution allows Congress to provide an action to redress
such humiliations. 200 If the requisite facts are proven, this action
can be defeated only by showing that the remedy it provides
would severely infringe other important rights of the dis-
criminator. According to this reasoning the fact that some acts of
discrimination result in greater injury than others is considered
only in fashioning a remedy. The analysis that follows will sug-
gest that the real badge of slavery imposed by discrimination in
contracting is not the insult to the rejected party but the actual
burden that such discrimination imposes on an individual. Sec-
199 See note 195 supra.
In some ways the McCrary holding is less dangerous to private rights than a holding
based on a public function theory of state action. But see Private Education, supra note 3;
Academies, supra note 8. The result under a state action theory would infringe individual
liberties no less than the McCrary result, but it would permit more analogies than the
McCrary reasoning and therefore more invasions of personal liberties.
200 See note 187 supra.
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tion 1981 should protect primarily against the imposition of such
burdens.
The courts in Riley and McCrary read the phrase "right to
contract" such that the right is infringed whenever one is re-
fused a contract on the basis of race. This reading, alternative to
the pre-Jones201 reading that the right is violated only when the
state refuses to give legal effect to a contract because of the race
of one or both parties,2 0 2 is not the only reasonable alternative.
The simple refusal of an individual or organization to contract
with another does not necessarily deprive the rejected party of
his freedom, because the latter may be able to go elsewhere with
little inconvenience or diminution of acceptable options. On the
other hand, for example, "when racial discrimination herds men
into ghettos and makes their ability to buy property turn on the
color of their skin, then [the exclusion of Negroes from white
communities] too is a relic of slavery. '203 When nonwhites are in
an inferior market position, the refusal of a white to contract
with a nonwhite indeed imposes a substantial burden upon the
nonwhite. The inferior bargaining position of the black is then a
badge of slavery which marks him in all aspects of his business
and social life.20 4
A far different situation would exist if the income and em-
ployment levels of blacks were equivalent to those of whites and
if blacks were not largely confined to inferior housing in urban
ghettos or depressed rural areas. Then the refusal to sell land to
a black, or to hire him for a job, would not bear such long-term
consequences and would not contribute to a string of insults to
the black person's dignity.
An inferior position in a given market is defined essentially
as one's inability to make and enforce contracts as favorable as
those available to most other contractors in the same market.
When such a general disability is attributable to a factor complete-
2 0 1 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
202 See text accompanying notes 29 & 30 supra.
203 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 442-43 (1968).
204 The Jones Court recognized the importance of racial restrictions in the private
housing market, though the holding does not depend on this recognition. Similar obser-
vations might have been made about the job market, to which the Court has recently
applied § 1981.Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 1716 (1975). Congress
recognized the inferior position of nonwhites in the job and housing markets in Tide VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970), and Title VIII of the 1968
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1970). (These acts were based on the commerce
power rather than the thirteenth amendment. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).)
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ly beyond the control of the actor, such as the accident of race, his
right to contract is denied more clearly than when he is merely
denied the opportunity to make a single contract for the same
reason. When such a blanket disadvantage exists, a class of con-
tracts is closed to the actor or open to him only on unfavorable
terms,20 5 so that his range of options is substantially narrowed.
He is presented with a genuine obstacle to achieving a legitimate
personal or business goal because of race, and such an obstacle is
an incident of slavery.
It may be more difficult to establish the generally inferior
position of blacks in the education market than in the housing or
employment markets. Because of the tradition of local control of
education, patterns in education markets may be much more
fragmented than in jobs or housing, so that courts will not be
able to take the kind of "judicial notice" of educational condi-
tions that they have taken in the other fields.
20 6
If in a given case a black plaintiff proves that he was denied
a contract for education on the basis of race and that because of
this he was placed in an inferior position in the market for edu-
cation, he has made out a far stronger case for relief than a
person who asserts only a denial of contract based on race. Colin
Gonzalez, one of the plaintiff children in McCrary, in fact gained
admission to another private school in the area.20 7 Although the
fact of making a single contract is no more proof of good market
position than is a single denial proof of a bad one, at least it
demonstrates that the plaintiffs may have retained the ability to
pursue desired options as effectively as most other contractors in
the marketplace. If this is true, their right to contract has not
been infringed in the sense under consideration. If, however,
their ability to find a school to their liking is substantially inferior
to that of similarly situated whites, then their right to contract
for the purpose of education has been infringed.
If the "right to contract" is interpreted as the right to an
equal position in the marketplace, which in this context means a
choice of schools substantially as wide as that enjoyed by whites
on equally favorable terms, then either an additional evidentiary
requirement has to be imposed on plaintiffs in order to prove a
205 The unfavorable terms would not necessarily have to be, and usually would not
be, economic terms. Rather, school administrators or admissions officers might avail
themselves of more subtle, perhaps psychological, means of establishing their authority
over black students that they would not employ with white students.
206 See note 204 supra.
207 363 F. Supp. at 1202.
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cause of action, or an additional defense would have to be avail-
able to their adversaries. Plaintiffs in cases like McCrary might be
required to show disadvantage in the education market; alterna-
tively, defendants who have discriminated might be allowed to
show that their victims suffered no market disadvantage. Justice
requires that the market showing be asserted as a defense rather
than as an additional part of the plaintiff's burden. Discrimina-
tion, even when arguably legal, is repugnant to the national
moral sense as expressed in the thirteenth amendment to the
Constitution; an individual claiming a right to discriminate
should be required to prove the harmlessness of his actions in
the market terms described above.2 ° s
The form that the market evidence must take will have to be
developed in the cases. Proof for a McCrary-type plaintiff might
be relatively easy in a locality like that of Cook v. Hudson, where
the only non-public school available is segregated; 20 9 it would be
quite difficult for a defendant there to prove no damage from
his discrimination. Proof of effect may be even easier in areas
where there are many segregated academies and little public
support for predominantly black public schools. 2 10 In other
areas, where many private schools are integrated, problems of
proof will be more difficult. For example, simply showing a dis-
proportion of the number of whites and blacks at private schools
in an area may not prove a market effect of discrimination or
rebut evidence showing no effect. Disproportions will need to be
shown after controlling for those factors normally associated
with private school entrance qualifications, such as ability to pay,
tested I.Q. level (at certain types of school), religion (if the local
private education market is dominated by religious schools), and
others. These disproportions will not always need to be shown at
208 A similar shift of burden has been approved by the Supreme Court in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In employment cases under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970), once a plaintiff shows the discriminatory
effect of an employment practice, the defendant employer must demonstrate that the
practice has a business justification. The plaintiff need not show that the employer had
discriminatory motives.
209 Note 105 supra & accompanying text.
Whether public schools are part of the relevant market for these purposes depends
on the schools in question. For example, if a public school provided education of the
same kind and quality as a private school in the same locale, it would be part of the same
market. (An incidental benefit to the public schools might flow from this formulation: If
public schools had to be equal in quality to the private schools in order to maintain the
right of the private schools to remain segregated, parents who wish to send their children
to segregated private schools would have less reason to oppose supporting the public
schools with their tax dollars.)
220 See Academies, supra note 8.
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the allegedly discriminatory school, but at the other private
schools in the locality.
The advantages of this reading of "right to contract" are
fairly clear. It requires proof of actual damage to the plaintiff in
one of his activities, transforming the content of "badge of slav-
ery" from insult to more concrete harm. Some private discrimi-
natory conduct will not be reached under this reading, but dis-
crimination will be reached whenever defendants fail to establish
that their conduct did not hamper plaintiffs' ultimate attainment
of their goals. Most importantly, this theory will substantially re-
duce the objections to enforcement of section 1981 which may
tend to limit rights of autonomy. As the Supreme Court has
noted, upholding certain associational rights may be at the ex-
pense of others' associational rights.2"' Enforcement of "equality
rights," which substantially restricts another individual's actions
or opportunity for action, can be justified more easily when con-
crete, objectively discernible injury is required than when the
only injury is insult. When this type of proof is required, it will
be more acceptable to shift the balance to favor the rights of
plaintiffs under the thirteenth amendment more heavily against
discriminators claiming rights of autonomy. Of course, interpret-
ing section 1981 in this way will not diminish the infringement of
rights of autonomy in cases in which plaintiffs prove that they
were disadvantaged in obtaining a quality education to their
satisfaction; the interpretation suggested here will only decrease
the number of successful plaintiffs and affected defendants.
Should a plaintiff force desegregation of the Calhoun Academy
of the Hudson case, the autonomy rights of parents, educators,
and students will be infringed to exactly the same degree under
this interpretation as under the McCrary majority's reading of
the statute.
The suggested interpretation of section 1981 contains some
disadvantages. First, it is inconsistent with the theory of most of
the section 1981 cases decided to date, which hold the statute to
be violated whenever a black cannot make a contract because of
his race.21 2 Results under the suggested reading will, however,
mostly be consistent with the results of most of these cases; they
will differ only when plaintiffs fail to prove adverse conse-
quences in the market.
Second, and more importantly, this reading would intro-
21 Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974).
212 See notes 38-47 supra & accompanying text.
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duce an anomaly into the law in that it might be difficult for the
prospective defendant to predict the legal consequences of his
behavior. Whether a single discriminatory act would be action-
able under the proposed reading of section 1981 would depend
on factors beyond the control of the discriminator, such as
whether and to what extent other individuals and organizations
providing the same service discriminate.213 The potential dis-
criminator might not know about racial conditions in the rele-
vant market. Although it is regrettable that one may not know
the consequences of one's conduct in all cases, the strong con-
stitutional and societal position against racial bias dictates that
the courts not be unwilling to require discriminators to act at
their own risk.
Another difficulty arises in defining the relevant market. In
an area such as private education the differences between in-
stitutions are often significant because the whole object of the
enterprise is to provide alternatives to standardized public school
methods. For example, assume that a nonwhite sought to place
his child in a "three R's" school in a community in which several
progressive private schools were integrated, most of the tradi-
tional schools were not, and the public schools were grossly in-
ferior. A court should probably hold that because educational
decisions generally are protected by the right of autonomy, the
plaintiff's assertion that he sought only a conservative school
must be respected as a legitimate choice; the smaller group of
traditional private schools would be the relevant market. This
process of definition must be undertaken on a case by case basis.
A final difficulty, more political than legal, is that the sug-
gested reading of section 1981 would probably force many
Southern private schools and schools in small communities to
integrate while leaving the North and schools in cities virtually
untouched. 214 Some degree of regional ill-will would doubtless
redound from this policy, but not as much as there might have
213 For example, assume a market of three equivalent private schools. Defendant
school is segregated but takes every white who applies. The other schools are integrated
but accept only students who score above 100 on a standardized admissions test. Plaintiff
scored below 100, was denied admission to the defendant school, and could thus make
out a case under the suggested formulation. A black student who scored above 100,
however, would not have a successful cause of action because of the existence of the
other schools which would have admitted him.
Under this approach the general injunction against discrimination presently em-
ployed in § 1981 cases, including McCrary, might not be appropriate. Injunctions would
have to be tailored more closely to particular situations.
214 Note that this is also a problem with the public function theory of state action
suggested in Academies, supra note 8, and Private Education supra note 3.
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been before the federal courts became as concerned with de
facto segregation in the North as with the more formal dis-
criminatory schemes in the South.215
In summary, the suggested reading of section 1981 has both
advantages and drawbacks. It must be decided whether the
added protection given rights of autonomy justifies section
1981's constricted coverage of private discrimination, the in-
creased complexity of litigation, and the introduction of certain
anomalies into the law. If, however, this reading is adopted,
rights of autonomy claimed by discriminating educators and
parents will not stand when the requirements of the rule are
satisfied. This rule would require that the judgment in McCrary
be vacated and the case remanded for findings about the educa-
tion market in Northern Virginia.
2 16
IV. CONCLUSION
When discrimination in private education exists, it imposes a
badge of slavery on the victims according to the sense of that
term since Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 21 7 Most courts that have
interpreted section 1981 have reasoned that any discrimination
in private education based on race imposes a badge of slavery.
The difference between the formulation followed in McCrary
and that developed in this Comment is in the degree of ac-
tual damage that must be shown in order to merit relief un-
der the statute. The more stringent requirement of concrete
harm is preferable because it ensures that constitutional rights
will be invaded only when their exercise would occasion serious
infringements of others' constitutional right to equality of treat-
ment under the law.
215 See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. One, 313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo. 1970) (opinion
on the merits) and 313 F. Supp. 90 (D. Colo. 1970) (opinion on remedies), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), modified and remanded, 413 U.S. 189
(1973).
216 If the Court of Appeals in Riley reverses the trial court's finding of fact, a similar
factual determination would have to be made on remand there.
217 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
